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Trying to Understand Software: Why
Microsoft v. AT&T Was Mistakenly
Decided
Drew J. Koning*
INTRODUCTION
In the recent Supreme Court case Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., two contentious issues in patent law jurisprudence collided:
1) extraterritorial protection of patents, and 2) the patenting of
software. The Court’s decision to appreciably limit software
patent protection is misguided as it fails to account for the
complexities of patent law as applied to modern technology.
A patent provides its owner with the right to exclude others
from utilizing the claimed invention.1 Under U.S. law, if someone
makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports an infringing invention
in the United States, that person may be liable for patent
infringement.2 Section 271(f) of the Patent Act provides patent
protection for infringement that occurs overseas if a component of
the patented item is first manufactured in the United States and
then exported for final assembly abroad.3 This statute is easily
applied to the manufacture of tangible goods such as gearboxes or
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2739. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.Sc. Physics & Astronomy,
Sheffield University, England, 1998. Drew Koning was an Informatics & Technical
Specialist for the American Museum of Natural History in New York from 2002–2005.
1
See 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.01 (2006).
2
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
3
35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
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electrical components, but courts have had difficulty applying the
statute to intangible components such as software. In today’s
global market, the U.S. software industry is increasingly reliant on
foreign sales to stay competitive, and so judicial interpretation of
extraterritorial protection has become a significant concern for the
industry.4
Part I of this Comment sets forth the history and case law
surrounding § 271(f) of the Patent Act. Part II addresses the
application of § 271(f) on software patents and the relevant case
law up to and including the recent Supreme Court case, Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp. Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of § 271(f) in Microsoft, arguing four points. First,
that software, whether tangible or not, satisfies the definition of
component. Second, that extending protection to software supplied
abroad would not lead to insurmountable damage awards. Third,
that leaving the matter for foreign tribunals to resolve would be
precarious as the results would vary dramatically from country to
country, and finally, that a ruling in favor of AT&T would likely
have been beneficial for the U.S. software industry.
I. THE ADVENT & HISTORY OF § 271(f)
In June of 1967, two Louisiana companies triggered a dispute
that would eventually give rise to the new subsection (f) of § 271.5
Laitram Corporation (“Laitram”), the inventor of a revolutionary
shrimp-peeling machine, sued Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc.
(“Deepsouth”), a competitor in the shrimp packaging industry.6
Laitram accused Deepsouth of infringing two of their patents.7
These two patents, ‘218 and ‘927, were directed to machines used

4

See Court Will Hear Microsoft Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2006, at C2.
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 926 (D.C. La. 1970);
130 CONG. REC. H10525, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827 (“This proposal responds
to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp. . . . .”).
6
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1037, 1037–46 (D.C.
La. 1969); see also Laitram Corporation, http://www.laitram.com (last visited Nov. 15,
2007).
7
See Laitram Corp., 301 F. Supp. at 1037–46.
5
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for removing the veins from the backs of peeled shrimp.8 The ‘218
patent disclosed a single embodiment of a “slitter” for cutting the
backs of the shrimp, exposing the veins for removal,9 while the
‘927 patent disclosed apparatus for removing the exposed vein.10
Deepsouth was not only selling these machines domestically, but
was also exporting the components of the patented inventions for
assembly abroad.11
Laitram sought an injunction claiming that § 271(a) of the
Patent Act should not only hold Deepsouth liable for domestic
infringement but should be interpreted to cover this “underhanded”
tactic of exporting individual components.12 The statute provides
for liability if someone “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention . . . .”13
Deepsouth argued that a face value reading of § 271(a) did not
cover their exportation practices.14 However, Laitram wanted the
court to extend the protection afforded to “patented inventions” to
include components of those inventions, even if by themselves
they might not infringe.15
While finding Deepsouth liable for domestic infringement
under § 271(a) of the Patent Act, the court was not convinced of
Laitram’s arguments and found that U.S. patent laws only covered
domestic infringement.16 Reviewing the pertinent case law, the
court stated that “a combination claim of a United States patent is
not infringed absent presence of the combination in assembled
form within the United States.”17
Laitram appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the
district court ruling. The circuit court found that in § 271(a), the
8

See id.
See id. at 1040–42.
10
See id. at 1051.
11
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc, 443 F.2d 936, 937 (5th Cir. 1971).
12
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 926, 926 (E.D. La.
1970).
13
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
14
Laitram Corp., 310 F. Supp. at 926.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 929.
17
Id. at 928 (internal quotation marks omitted).
9
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word “makes” should not be given a technical construction, but
rather understood by its ordinary meaning.18 The court held that
when all the parts of a patented machine are produced in the
United States and that the final assembly abroad is only a minor
aspect of the manufacturer, then the machine is “made” within the
United States.19 This ruling gave an entirely new reading of §
271(a) and was immediately appealed by Deepsouth to the United
States Supreme Court.
On May 30, 1972, the Supreme Court decided by a 5–4
majority to reverse the Fifth Circuit’s decision.20 Justice White,
writing for the majority, held that § 271(a) did not cover this
particular practice of exporting the components of a patented
device.21 The Court stated, “[w]e cannot endorse the view that the
‘substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of [a] machine’
constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a
combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of
the whole and not the manufacture of its parts.”22 The Court noted
that what was at stake was the right of American companies to
compete with an American patent holder in foreign markets, and
that the Court would require a clear signal from Congress before
approving the position of a company such as Laitram.23
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, foresaw that the
majority’s result would unduly reward “the artful competitor who
uses another’s invention in its entirety and who seeks to profit
thereby.”24 The minority’s analysis hinged on the fact that
“everything was accomplished in this country except putting the
pieces together as directed” and that this subverts “the
Constitutional scheme of promoting the Progress of Science and
useful Arts . . . .”25

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 443 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1971).
See id. at 939.
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 534 (1972).
Id. at 528.
Id.
See id. at 531.
Id. at 532–33.
Id. at 533–34.
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The cases immediately following the decision applied the
Supreme Court’s ruling. In John Mohr & Sons v. Vacudyne Corp.,
the district court held that if an inventor desired patent protection
in markets other than the United States, then Congressional intent
commanded this protection be obtained in those markets.26
In Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., the infringing
party, relying on Deepsouth as precedent, argued that its foreign
sales should be excluded from the damages calculations because
their infringing products were not placed in truck assemblies in this
country.27 But the district court declined to interpret Deepsouth so
narrowly. Instead, relying on the statutory language of § 271(a),
the court found an infringement because the manufacturing of the
entire patented invention had taken place within the United
States.28
Twelve years later, in 1984, with little forewarning Congress
introduced an amendment to the Patent Act of 1952 that would
“close a loophole” that was created as a result of Deepsouth.29 The
amendment was § 271(f), which put forth two propositions.30 The
first, § 271(f)(1) stated that:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a
substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined
in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside
of the United States in a manner that would infringe
the patent if such combination occurred within the
United States, shall be liable as an infringer.31
The second, § 271(f)(2) stated that:

26

John Mohr & Sons v. Vacudyne Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 579 F. Supp. 353, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
28
Id. at 376.
29
See generally, 130 CONG. REC. H10525 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5827.
30
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) outlines infringement liability of patents. The statute
currently includes subdivisions (a) through (i). Id.
31
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).
27
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Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any
component of a patented invention that is especially
made or especially adapted for use in the invention
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where
such component is uncombined in whole or in part,
knowing that such component is so made or adapted
and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner
that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as
an infringer.32
The Congressional record contains very little information
regarding the enactment of § 271(f).33 The statute was but one of a
handful of additions Congress made to the Patent Act of 1954 and
was considered an addition that would “prevent copiers from
avoiding U.S. patents by supplying components of a patented
product in this country so that the assembly of the components
may be completed abroad.”34 Likely lobbying groups could have
been U.S. manufacturers who were concerned with the possibility
of overseas patent infringement; however, Congressman
Kastenmeier, who introduced the statute, left no record of what
transpired.35
After the introduction of § 271(f), courts began to apply the
added patent protection that the statute provided U.S.
manufacturers. But, the few courts that were presented with §
271(f) arguments grappled with the ambiguity of the statute’s
language when trying to determine whether extraterritorial patent
protection existed.

32

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
See generally 130 CONG. REC. H10525 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5827.
34
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5828.
35
See Telephone Interview with Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, on file with author
(June 1, 2007).
33
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From 1984 to 2000, § 271(f) arguments were presented in only
twenty-four cases.36 Of these, many courts were reluctant to attach
liability. For example, the Southern District of New York denied
the application of § 271(f) because the defendant’s products were
first manufactured abroad and only stored in the United States
before export to Canada.37 The only situations where courts felt
comfortable attaching liability were in the handful of cases that
presented facts precisely analogous to Deepsouth.38
But by the turn of the century, the global software market,
fueled by the dot-com industry, had created a surge in new patent
litigations.39 The holdings of these cases have been inconsistent,
creating a great deal of uncertainty for the software industry. The
following section examines these cases and the arguments put forth
by stakeholders in the software industry.
II. TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE UNDER § 271(f)
As discussed above, § 271(f) was designed to protect U.S.
manufacturing interests. In 1984, the year the statute was
introduced, the overwhelming majority of U.S. manufacturing
consisted of tangible products such as automobiles and, in the case
of Deepsouth, shrimp-peeling machines.40 But in the last twenty
years, U.S. manufacturing has changed significantly. The U.S.
economy has shifted from tangible products to intangibles such as
services and software. In 1996, the U.S. software market
accounted for over 77% of the market worldwide.41 Likewise, this

36

Lexis and Westlaw search results of § 271(f) provide twenty-four hits.
See Windsurfing Int’l v. Fred Ostermann GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812, 820–21
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
38
See, e.g., T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 593 (N.D. Okla. 1989)
(finding liability where the defendant had shipped all components of an infringing device
from Oklahoma to Venezuela for assembly abroad).
39
From 2000 to 2007, over forty-five cases involving § 271(f) have been filed in
federal courts.
40
See Highdeal, Inc., Overcoming the Profit Challenge in an Intangible Economy
(2002), http://www.tmforum.org/browse.aspx?catID=884&linkID=25404&docID=1423.
41
See Press Briefing, Stanford Univ., The US Domination Of Worldwide Software
Products Sales Increased in 1995 (Oct. 17, 1996), available at http://www.stanford.edu/
group/scip/avsgt/usmktshare1096.pdf.
37
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shift in the economy created a burden on the courts to address the
problematic area of software patents under § 271(f).
First, there is an intense debate over whether software should
even be granted patent protection.42 However, in 1981 the
Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr held that a device using
computer software, which was an integral part of the device, was a
patentable object.43
The Court stated that while software
algorithms themselves may not be patented, devices that utilized
them may.44
This less than clear decision led to a substantial increase in
software patents being granted by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and a host of litigations challenging the validity
of such patents.45 Further confusion arose on how § 271(f) applied
to software patents. The key language of § 271(f) discusses
“components” being “supplied” abroad.
The courts were,
therefore, left with the question of whether software code is a
“component” of a patented device and how software must be
“supplied” to create an infringement.46
In a series of cases after 2000, the Federal Circuit looked to
address some of these issues and fashion some guidelines for
which the industry could follow. The Federal Circuit in Pellegrini
v. Analog Devices, Inc. held that computer chips designed in the
United States but manufactured abroad did not infringe a patent
under § 271(f) because the chips themselves were never made,
42

See Philip H. Albert, Lowering the Volume in the Software Patent Debate,
LINUXINSIDER, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/41376.html; see also
Graham Bowley, In Decisive Vote, EU Rejects Law on Software Patents, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., July 7, 2005, at 13 (describing the fierce debate taking place in the European
Union).
43
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
44
Id. at 186.
45
For example, a search of the USPTO database for patents listed under the
specification “software” issued in 1980 found 464 patents granted while the same
specification found 3,027 patents granted in 1990. See U.S. Patent and Full-Text Image
Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2007) (results were found using the search term “spec/software” and limiting results by
the appropriate date ranges); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting the
number of cases filed).
46
See Virginia Zaunbrecher, Eolas, AT&T, & Union Carbide: The New
Extraterritoriality of U.S. Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33, 37–40 (2006).
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used, or sold in the United States or physically “supplied” from the
United States.47 The court held that under § 271(f)(1) there is no
liability “unless components are shipped from the United States for
assembly.”48 The court added that “‘[s]upplying or causing to be
supplied’ in § 271(f)(1) clearly refers to physical supply of
components, not simply to the supply of instructions . . . .”49 This
interpretation of § 271(f) created a presumption that § 271(f) did
not apply to software.
But that holding did not last long. The following year, the
Federal Circuit in Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. held
that software code written in the United States and sent abroad on
“golden master disks” for use abroad did infringe a U.S. patent
because the code qualified as a “component” of a patented
invention under § 271(f).50 The Eolas court held that the language
of § 271(f) did not limit itself to machines or physical structures,
but included all forms of invention eligible for patenting.51 The
court reasoned that software was much more than merely a set of
instructions, instead software code “is probably the key part of this
patented invention.”52
The Federal Circuit Court extended this holding the same year
(over a dissent) in AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., finding that
master copies of software sent abroad may be deemed “supplied”
from the United States for purposes of § 271(f).53
These three cases, Pellegrini, Eolas and AT&T, were seen as
being at odds with each other and were widely criticized by the
software industry.54 In NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., the
Federal Circuit once again was presented with the question of
extraterritorial patent rights for software.55 In an amicus brief in
47

375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id.
49
Id. at 1118.
50
399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
51
See id.
52
Id.
53
414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
54
Harold C. Wegner, A Foreign Square Peg in a Domestic Round Hole,
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/3467/Foreigh%20Square
%20Peg.pdf (last visited June 16, 2007).
55
392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48
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support of Research in Motion, Intel argued that “[w]hile each of
these cases purports to distinguish the next, the ultimate holdings
are difficult to square, and they lack a common analytical
approach. The Court has yet to take a consistent and holistic view
of infringement liability in the transnational context.”56 Intel’s
brief shows the frustration that the software industry felt with these
inconsistent cases. The uncertainty left many patent holders
unsure of what protection they held and where it applied.
The Supreme Court finally agreed to address the conflicting
case law surrounding § 271(f) by granting certiorari in AT&T
Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. The case involved a patent for a speech
codec57 held by AT&T, which was allegedly infringed by
Microsoft’s Windows Operating System product.58 AT&T sought
damages for every copy of Windows installed on all domestically
manufactured computers and every copy that had been installed on
computers abroad.59 Microsoft had stipulated to all domestic
infringement, but moved in limine to exclude evidence of foreign
sales in the damages award.60 Microsoft asked the Federal Circuit
to apply the holding of Pellegrini and find that “supply from the
United States of intangible information, such as design information
and instructions for foreign component manufacture, cannot
constitute infringement under § 271(f).”61 Microsoft’s argument
rested on the presumption that the single “golden master disk” they
had sent abroad was merely a set of instructions to be copied onto
a foreign disk for foreign installation on foreign computers.62
Meanwhile, AT&T—relying on the Diamond and Eolas
decisions—argued that software was a patentable component and

56

Brief for Intel Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, NTP, 392 F.3d 1336
(2004) (No. 03-1615), 2005 WL 4798098.
57
A speech codec is a software program that is capable of coding-converting a speech
signal into a more compact code and decoding-converting the more compact code back
into a signal that sounds like the original speech signal. Speech Coding, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_encoding (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
58
See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
Replacement Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 3, AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d 1366,
2004 WL 4990677.
62
Id. at 7–9.
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that the statutory language of § 271(f) did not limit itself to only
machines or physical structures.63
The Federal Circuit was persuaded by AT&T’s arguments and
held that even though only a single copy of the infringing software
was manufactured in the United States and sent abroad, the
resulting copies were essentially supplied from the United States.64
Curiously, Judge Rader, who had written the Eolas opinion, wrote
the dissent arguing that the “copying and supplying are separate
acts with different consequences” and that the majority had gone
too far giving “extraterritorial effect to U.S. patent laws.”65
Before the Supreme Court, Microsoft continued to argue their
two main propositions. First, that the “golden master disk” did not
constitute a “component” of a patent, arguing that the disk itself
was just a blueprint of the software code.66 Second, the shipping
of a single disk (or transmission over the internet) did not
constitute the “supply” of that component.67
Because of the major impact the decision would have on the
U.S. software industry, the case drew a lot of attention from
academics and leaders in the software industry.68 These interested
parties, including law professors, the Department of Justice, Yahoo
and other software companies, submitted amicus briefs on behalf
of AT&T and Microsoft, with the lion’s-share supporting
Microsoft.69
One such amicus brief, submitted by professors Mark Lemley
and John Duffy, agreed with the Federal Circuit’s holdings in
Eolas and AT&T that “software code, like any other product, can
be a component of a patented invention,” but they argued that
copies of a “component” made in a foreign country are not

63
Replacement Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 28, 47–48, AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d 1366,
2004 WL 4990676.
64
See AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370.
65
Id. at 1372–74 (Rader, J., dissenting).
66
Brief of Petitioner at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No.
05–1056), 2006 WL 3693463.
67
Id.
68
Microsoft v. AT&T: Extraterritorial Enforcement of US Patents,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/05/microsoft_v_att_1.html (May 1, 2007).
69
Id.
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“supplied” from the United States.70 They wrote that ruling in
favor of AT&T “has the potential to increase dramatically the
patent liability of U.S.-based firms and thereby encourage firms to
relocate their research and development facilities outside of the
United States.”71
This policy concern was addressed in the amicus brief of U.S.
Philips Corporation (“Philips”). Philips argued that it is difficult to
believe that U.S. software companies will migrate to Europe
“where they might not be able to patent their software at all, just to
sell a product abroad that they cannot sell in the U.S.”72 They also
claimed that it is even less probable that U.S. software companies
will move to countries with little or no intellectual property
protection, such as China.73
Oral argument was held on February 26, 2007 in front of eight
Justices, with Justice Roberts recusing himself due to a conflict of
interest.74 As the Justices listened to AT&T and Microsoft’s
arguments, they grappled with the nuances of software
technology.75 Unlike mechanical patents, software patents pose
conceptual issues that many find difficult to comprehend without a
deeper knowledge of electrical engineering.76 This lack of a clear
understanding was evidenced by the Justices repeated requests for
software analogies such as blueprints and player pianos from both
parties.77

70

Brief for Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
6–8, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 05–1056), 2006 WL 3740618.
71
Id. at 2.
72
Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. & Philips Electronics North America Corp. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 05–1056),
2007 WL 197102.
73
Id.
74
Justice Roberts owns shares of Microsoft. See Henry Blodget, How To Invest Like a
Supreme Court Justice: What John Roberts’ Portfolio Reveals About His Character,
SLATE, July 26, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2123414.
75
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 051056), 2007 WL 541886.
76
Is software a set of instructions that computers follow, or is software a process that
computers talk to in order to carry out functions? The answer is best seen in a new light,
devoid of analogies, as software is a new medium that should be given its own category.
77
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 34, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No.
05–1056), 2007 WL 541886.
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In the end, the Justices focused their questions on the supply
issue and Justice Breyer directed his attention to the issue of
whether or not a simple knowledge exchange would constitute an
infringement.78
On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court, in a 7-1 majority,
reversed the Federal Circuit ruling in favor of Microsoft.79 Justice
Ginsburg, writing the majority opinion, addressed the two
arguments put forth by Microsoft. First, the Court held that a
tangible copy of computer software, not the software in the
abstract, qualifies as a “component” within the meaning of § 271(f)
of the Patent Act.80 The Court held that software can be
“conceptualized in (at least) two ways.”81 Drawing on yet more
analogies, the Court held that software can be seen as either “[t]he
notes of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony” (a set of abstract
“instructions themselves detached from any medium”) or the
“[s]heet music for Beethoven’s Ninth” (“a tangible ‘copy’ of
software, the instructions encoded on a medium such as a CDROM”).82
In its only reference to Eolas, the Supreme Court did not
exactly overturn the holding, noting that the Federal Circuit had
not articulated whether the software at issue was software in the
abstract, or a tangible copy of software.83
Secondly, the Supreme Court held that § 271(f) was “not
applicable where computer software was first sent from the United
States to a foreign computer manufacturer on a master disk, or by
electronic transmission, and then copied by the foreign recipient
for installation on computers made and sold abroad . . . .”84 The
Court’s rationale was that the “copies, as ‘components’ installed on

78

Id. at 37.
See Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1746.
80
See id.
81
Id. at 1754.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1754 n.10. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg noted the ambiguity on that
issue in the Federal Circuit’s opinion in AT&T. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–
15, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 05–1056), 2007 WL 541886.
84
Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1746.
79
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the foreign made computers, were not supplied from the United
States.”85
The Court closed by stating that “[i]f patent law is to be
adjusted better ‘to account for the realities of software
distribution,’ the alteration should be made after focused
legislative consideration, and not by the Judiciary forecasting
Congress’ likely disposition.”86
III. MISTAKEN ARGUMENTS & BAD POLICY
The Justices’ dependence on analogies of dated technologies
such as blueprints, player pianos, and sheet music, reveals some of
the difficulties the Court had in understanding software and its
function in a patentable machine.87 It was this confusion, along
with various policy arguments made by Microsoft and its
supporters, that likely influenced the Court’s holding. The
following subsections examine this confusion and argue four
points: first, that software should be considered a component of a
patented invention; second, that extending protection to software
supplied abroad would not lead to insurmountable damage awards;
third, that relying on foreign tribunals to resolve patent disputes
emanating from the United States would result in uncertainty for
U.S. software companies; and finally, that a ruling in favor of
AT&T would likely have been beneficial for the U.S. software
industry.

A. Software is a Component
While many argue that software should not be patentable at
all, the simple fact remains that under Diamond software is “an
88

85

Id.
Id. at 1760 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (2005)).
87
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 34, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No.
05–1056), 2007 WL 541886.
88
See Posting of Jabari Zakiya to Free Software Magazine Blog, Software Ain’t
Patentable, Damn It!, http://www.freesoftwaremagazine.com/blogs/software_aint_
patentable_damn_it (Jan. 3, 2007); see also Posting of Dana Blankenhorn to ZDNet, The
86

KONING_022508_FINAL

2008]

2/25/2008 7:21:13 PM

TRYING TO UNDERSTAND SOFTWARE

881

integral part of a device”89 and, therefore, a component of a
patentable object. The definitions of software found in dictionaries
and encyclopedias are varied and are often complicated for a
layperson to understand.90 But most of these definitions describe
an invention that is more than just a set of instructions.91 Indeed,
only Justice Stevens, writing the lone dissent in Microsoft, realized
that software was not a mere blueprint.92 Disagreeing with the
majority’s analogy of software as a set of instructions, Stevens
wrote that whether incorporated into a medium, or standalone,
software clearly satisfies the dictionary definition of component.93
Furthermore, he wrote that “unlike a blueprint that merely instructs
a user how to do something, software actually causes infringing
conduct to occur.”94 Justice Stevens provided his own analogy that
software “is more like a roller that causes a player piano to produce
sound than sheet music that tells a pianist what to do.”95 Stevens
also drew on the statutory language of § 271(f)(2) claiming that
software’s “sole intended use is an infringing use” and that it is
“surely not ‘a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use’ as that term is used in § 271(f)(2).”96
Software is an integral part of any computer. In fact, the
software in Microsoft’s operating system, which contained
AT&T’s codec, is perhaps the most important component of any
computer. To argue that software is just a set of instructions, and
that the tangible CD or hard drive that contains these instructions is
the integral component, is an absurd proposition. In the case of
AT&T’s speech codec, one could hardly argue that the novel and

Real Issue in the Software Patent Fight, http://blogs.zdnet.com/open-source/?p=1552
(Oct. 17, 2007, 08:37 EST).
89
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981).
90
See VAN NOSTRAND’S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (Douglas M. Considine ed., 7th ed.
1989); see also Software, Webopedia, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/
software.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
91
See id.
92
See Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1763 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93
See id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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useful aspect of the invention is the CD the code is stored upon.97
Software is a new and extraordinary invention, which does not fit
neatly into any preconceptions of what a patentable object is or
should be. It is time to recognize software for what it is—an
extraordinary invention for which antiquated analogies will simply
not work.
B. Copying of Software Abroad is Supplied
The Court in Microsoft decreed that copies of Windows made
abroad from a “golden disk” did not amount to supply from the
United States.98 The Court, comparing the copying of software to
that of key duplication, found that because “the copies of Windows
actually installed on the foreign computers were not themselves
supplied from the United States,” § 271(f) did not apply.99 Justice
Alito’s concurring opinion likened the act of software supply to
that of an author sending her manuscript to a scrivener, who in turn
copies the story by hand into a blank book.100
This fundamental misunderstanding of software by the Court
and their unwillingness to provide software with its own criteria
for supply101 under § 271(f), allowed Microsoft to take advantage
of the relative ease of software duplication and transportation. As
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, had Microsoft sent thousands
of individual copies of Windows on CD’s, then perhaps the Court
would have ruled differently.102

97

To be granted a patent by the USPTO, the invention must be both novel and useful.
See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 2106
(8th ed., rev. 6 2007) (detailing the authoritative reference on the practices and
procedures relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO defining
the applicable statutes, rules, and case law).
98
127 S. Ct. at 1757.
99
Id.
100
See id. at 1761 n.* (Alito, J., concurring).
101
Software may be supplied by means never envisioned by the authors of the Patent
Act or § 271(f). See Brief for Respondent at 28, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007)
(No. 05–1056), 2007 WL 186523 (providing a more detailed argument on the supply
issue).
102
See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1762–63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Microsoft and its amici argued that to hold otherwise would
lead to insurmountable damage awards.103 This is a view shared
by many opponents of § 271(f) and is often cited as one of the
main reasons why the statute should be dissolved or limited.104
This is a flimsy argument as software companies would not face
endless liability for infringing devices that are assembled
abroad.105 To the contrary, liability would be determined by the
companies’ own actions.106 If “they send software abroad with the
intent that it be installed on multiple infringing devices, [then] they
[would] owe damages for those devices, no more, no less.”107
Furthermore, AT&T presented evidence in their Brief that
refutes Microsoft’s argument of endless liability. Microsoft
receives a royalty for every “legal” copy of Windows installed on
foreign manufactured computers.108 Thus, the calculation of the
appropriate damages would be a simple percentage of those profits
received.109 Microsoft fully acknowledges that the number of
golden masters it sends abroad does not limit the number of units it
supplies.110 In Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
Microsoft argued that it was entitled to tax deductions for all
foreign sales of software replicated from Microsoft’s golden
master abroad, claiming that such copies were “export property”
under the statute.111 The Ninth Circuit agreed that all copies
created from the golden master were export property, thereby
providing Microsoft with another $31 million in claimed
deductions for 1990 and 1991.112 If Microsoft is able to gain a tax
advantage for each copy of Windows that is “copied” abroad, it
103
See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 5 (arguing that the real issue
“lost” in the pages of arguments made by Microsoft and its amici is the proper measure of
damages).
104
See James Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws:
Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1215, 1217 (2006).
105
See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 6.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 32.
109
See id. at 34.
110
See id. at 32.
111
See Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 311 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2002).
112
Id. at 1188.

KONING_022508_FINAL

884

2/25/2008 7:21:13 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

would only seem fair to attribute the copying as supplied and
demand that AT&T receive their appropriate share of those profits.
AT&T made this argument before the Federal Circuit and
Microsoft responded that the “arguments regarding construction of
the tax code are irrelevant to the proper construction of the patent
code . . . and ‘has no bearing on the [patent infringement] case at
bar.’”113 The Federal Circuit did not address this issue and neither
party raised it before the Supreme Court.
C. Foreign Interpretation of § 271(f)
Also in this case, Justice Ginsburg argued that patent
infringement occurring abroad must be dealt with by the
appropriate foreign jurisdiction and that the U.S. court system has
no business extending their patent laws overseas.114 But, software
patent law is non-existent in many countries, and so arguing that
foreign patent laws should be utilized for extraterritorial protection
is an unavailing point.115
Yet, Justice Ginsburg’s argument is an interesting segue into
examining how a foreign court might have ruled in Microsoft.
While the United States has arguably the most elaborate patent
system in the world, there has been a great deal of discussion on
whether the U.S. model has over-extended its boundaries.116
The international viewpoints on extraterritorial reach of patent
laws are varied. In the European Union, patent laws emphasize the
non-extraterritorial nature of the protection given.117 Furthermore,
European patent protection of software is much more limited than
in the United States. This lesser protection is due in part to

113
See Brief of Petitioner at 17, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (2005)
(No. 04–1285), 2004 WL 4990677 (quoting Prima Tek II, LLC v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d
1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
114
See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007).
115
See Brief for Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, et al. as Amici Curae
Supporting Respondent, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 2007 WL 215264.
116
See Robert Pierson, Extraterritorial Reach Of U.S. Patent Law: Has The Federal
Circuit Gone Too Far?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 651, 692 (2007).
117
See Ladas & Parry, Patent Litigation in Europe, http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/
ForeignPatentLitigation/Europe_Patent_Lit.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
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significant public movements against big business and government
intervention in software development.118
This point of view is shared by some patent law academics in
the United States. Professor Samuelson argues that “[b]ased on
twenty-four years of studying software intellectual property
protection, I believe the software industry would be no less
innovative and no less competitive in the world market if software
patents disappeared tomorrow.”119
In Europe, therefore, a
Microsoft type case is not likely to result in a favorable decision
for AT&T.
In other countries, however, tribunals examine the equitable
principles of jurisprudence in deciding how far to extend patent
protection.
In Japan, while there is no specific statute or case on point, in
Canon Inc. v. Recycle Assist Co., the Japanese High Court
addressed the issues of patent protection for export items.120 The
Court held that the refilling of a patented item for sale overseas
was an infringement, even though the refilling took place in
China.121 Recycle Assist had collected used Canon ink cartridges,
which had been legally sold in Japan and overseas by Canon or its
licensee, and shipped them to China.122 In China, the cartridge’s
ink tank was reconditioned by cleaning and refilling it with ink.
Recycle Assist then imported and sold the reconditioned Canon ink
cartridges in Japan and overseas.123 The High Court held that the
act of refilling the cartridges with ink was an essential element
recited in the claims, which related to the technical idea of the
patented invention and was therefore an infringement.124 The
118

See Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, Patentability and Democracy in
Europe, http://eupat.ffii.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2007). But see Astron Clinica Ltd. v.
Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, (2008) EWHC 85 (pat) (where
a U.K. court recently held that software programs should in principle be patentable).
119
Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Software Patents and the Metaphysics of
271(f), 50 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 15, 19 (2007).
120
See Canon Inc. v. Recycle Assist Co., Ltd., 1922 Hanrei Jiho 30 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 31,
2006).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
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Court held that the products sold in Japan infringed Canon’s
patent.125
If Microsoft were to come before the Japanese High Court, one
could foresee the court finding for AT&T. The Court’s decision in
Canon reveals an equitable layer of jurisprudence that goes beyond
mere statute. Microsoft was found, after all, to have infringed
AT&T’s patent with each copy of its Windows software sold in the
United States and therefore intent to infringe abroad is arguably
present.
The Federal Court of Australia addressed a similar situation
after infringing goods were exported to Papua New Guinea to
avoid seizure by the government.126 In discussing the court’s
jurisdiction, the court acknowledged that their Patent Act contains
no express power to order such seizure.127 The court then stated,
“it is not disputed that the Court has general power to make the
order in accordance with established principles of equitable
relief.”128 Furthermore, “the powers possessed by courts with
equitable jurisdiction for the enforcement of their orders are . . . as
wide . . . as the occasion at hand may require.”129 The court held
that the respondents should not be allowed to “gain a benefit” by
“sneaking” the goods out of the jurisdiction.130 On the other hand,
the court found that “the presence of the products in Papua New
Guinea [did] not place the rights of the [patent holder] at risk and
in need of protection.”131 One can infer that if the Federal Court of
Australia were presented with the facts of Microsoft, it would rule
in AT&T’s favor. As in Japanese jurisprudence, the Australian
court seems to be making a decision based on equitable principles
rather than statutory interpretation.
While both the Japanese and Australian decisions fall short of
the broad protection § 271(f) offers a U.S. patent holder, the
125

Id.
See Roussel Uclaf v. Pan Labs. Pty Ltd. (1994) 51 F.C.R. 316 (Austl.).
127
Id. at 319.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 321 (quoting I C F SPRY, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES 361–68 (4th ed.
1990)).
130
Id. at 320.
131
Id.
126
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judicial intent to go beyond mere statutory interpretation is clear.
Microsoft did stipulate to infringing a patent held by AT&T, and
so based purely on fairness, Microsoft should be liable for all
infringing sales.
D. Damage to the Software Industry
In the end, the Court could have made arguments favoring
either side of the component and supply debate, as the Federal
Circuit did. The Court’s decision was, therefore, likely influenced
by the underlying policy arguments discussing the effect one
holding would have on the software industry. While the outcome
of Microsoft is certain to have an effect on the software industry, it
is difficult to predict to what extent (or degree) the U.S. software
industry will suffer. Many critics of the Federal Circuit’s decision
believe the U.S. software industry would have suffered if
Microsoft had lost. One such critic, James Farrand, argues that if
the Supreme Court had affirmed the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of § 271(f), U.S.-based software companies would
be tempted to move their research and development overseas in
order to avoid the “perverse” effects of § 271(f) infringement.132
As Philips pointed out in its amicus brief, this is a flawed
argument.133 Software companies, like all U.S. companies, would
have benefited from the added patent protection § 271(f) can
provide.134 While a ruling in favor of AT&T could have provided
an incentive for certain software companies to move development
off-shore to avoid possible § 271(f) infringement suits, the U.S.
patent laws are considered the strongest in the world, and hold a
great appeal for domestic and foreign companies wishing to obtain
patent protection.135 The Federal Circuit’s ruling in AT&T
prevents U.S. software companies from creating “infringement
mills” overseas that would make software available to anyone in
the world via the web.136 The application of § 271(f) to software
would ensure that any software development taking place in the
132
133
134
135
136

See Farrand, supra note 104, at 1239.
See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 6.
Id.
Id.
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 49.
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U.S. is immediately protected, even if the bulk of development
occurs on foreign soil. Interestingly, while critic Farrand argued
that if AT&T had won, a mass exodus of U.S. software companies
would have ensued, at no point does he claim that § 271(f)’s initial
introduction in 1984 led to any U.S. manufacturing migration
overseas. In fact, most would agree that any industry migration
over the past thirty years has been due to high corporate tax rates,
cheap labor markets, and weak labor standards in foreign
nations.137 Additionally, if some facets of the software industry
were to suffer, it would only be those companies that desire to
infringe the inventions of others.138 As Justice Blackmun stated in
his dissent in Deepsouth, today’s result will unduly “reward the
artful competitor who uses another’s invention in its entirety and
who seeks to profit thereby”139 and that this “subverts the
Constitutional scheme of promoting the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”140
Furthermore, software providers are moving in the direction of
Web Services.141 Instead of consumers buying software from a
retailer and then installing it on their home or office computer, a
consumer’s computer becomes a portal to software applications
that run on network servers located at a central site and are
accessed through the internet.142 The Supreme Court’s ruling
might have inadvertently provided the perfect incentive for
software companies to run such servers overseas, thereby avoiding
possible infringement liability under § 271(f). If this server-side
solution does take hold, it will be Microsoft, the biggest software
137
Regardless of this decision, software companies are already moving a lot of their
research and development operations abroad, most notably to Ireland, where low
corporate tax rates and a large technology educated work force has fueled the migration.
See, e.g., Shelley Emling, Ireland Works to Stay in the Outsourcing Game, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., June 5, 2004, at 19.
138
See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 21.
139
See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532–33 (1972).
140
Id. at 534 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
141
See David Coursey, Server Versions of Microsoft Apps Speak to Web Services
Future, EWEEK, Oct. 13, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Enterprise-Apps/ServerVersions-of-Microsoft-Apps-Speak-to-Web-Services-Future/.
142
See Web Services Tutorial, http://www.w3schools.com/webservices/default.asp (last
visited Feb. 1, 2008) (providing an introduction to Web Services).
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company on the planet, who lobbies Congress to extend § 271(f) to
cover extraterritorial regions.
CONCLUSION
The majority’s opinion in Microsoft exposes a fundamental
misunderstanding of software and its unique function in modern
technology. With Justice Stevens as the lone voice of reason, the
future of software patent protection seems bleak. The onus is now
on Congress to decide whether to modify § 271(f) to include
software or to let the industry rely on the uncertainty of patent
protection abroad. If software is to be afforded adequate patent
protection, then Congress must act quickly. Congress took twelve
years after Deepsouth to close that “loophole,” and if Congress
decides to wait that long again, they risk the statute becoming
obsolete in today’s global market.

